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STATEMENT

OF

THE

CASE

Respondents THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ULRICH filed
on August 31, 2010 a contended verified complaint, with
two Exhibits A and B,

consisttltn~

of 14 pages,

Only respondent

THOMAS ULRI[H signed the so denominated verification. ( R: 01-14)
Exhibit A was averrred tO be "A true and correct copy
of the deed to the Ulrich Propetty." (, R; 3, 9-10)

But the

referenced deed was not signed by the stated trustees, who
were grantors to the respondents, nor did such Exhibit A., referrenced, include nor make appellant nor his real property of 40
acres, known and referred to as "The Peacock Property" which
on the date of the complaint's filing was owned in undivided
interests by Milan and Diana Cheyovich of California, &f an undivided one-fourth

(~)

ownership, and the undivided remainder,

of the undivided 3/4 ownership owned then by Appellant.
Exhibit B, attached was a

nof:~_rized

copy of a Corporation

Warranty Deed, dated .June 9th 1994, from TETON WEST CORPORATION,
signed by its President GEORGE C. HATCH, a§ Grantor, conveying
40 acres to: "JACK LEE McLEAN, Trustee of the JACK LEE McLEAN
family trust, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; MILAN CHEYOVICH and DIJ\NA CHEYOVICH, Trustees
of the CHEYOVICH FAMILY TRUST; -a£3 -"to an undivided
one-fourth interest; WAYNE DAWSON, TRustee of the
DAWSON FAMILY TRUST'_ as to an undivided one- fourth
interest; and TARGHEE POWDER EMPORIUM, LTD, as to
an undivided one-fourth interest . . . " ("R: 12-14)
''On information and belief;' per paragraph 4 and 5, respondent tT.f:l'l:D:MA'S ULRICH averred that "Bach claims an interest in the
following described real property located in

T~ton

County, Idaho ,

<tNt£1 tc,$1,;Qt~~t<e;tx·a~t li~-"~sou:t I} 1J L: the· ·uxr-.5 elf Rr1:-ope'1'.t y( . e-the: :·: :J1ctc h: .Pr;__o:n e rty·' ) ; "
1

that "a tnae and correct copy of the deed through which Bach
and others originally obtained right to the Bach Property is
attached hereto as Exhibit B'.' . . "The named Defendants may also
claim some right or interest in the Bach Property." ( R: 03-4)
No other "named Defendants" were stated, designated nor
made defendants to the complaint, nor ever referred to again.
Paragraph 8 of the complaint averred: "The Ulrich Property
Easement is denoted in the deed to the Bach Property."

f

R:

04)

No such designation, description nor statement is shown on
Exhibit B, as "The Ulrich
~'

Prop~rty

Easement."

In fact, Exhibit

dated June 9, 1994 was recorded in Teton County as Instrument

No.

11646~

and makes no mention, reference nor identification

of the respondents in any paragraph or language.

(. R: 012-14)

Moreover, Exhibit A, unsigned by the trustee grantor to the
respondents is date filed December 11, 19 9 6 (two years, six months
and two days after Appellant's undivided title, joint venture,
was recorded; Exhibit A, was file/recorded as Teton Instrument
125858.

(1R: 10-11) Such instrument 125858 makes no mention, ref-

erence nor identification of appellant nor of the other undivided
one fourth owners trusts in the Peacock 40 acres.

Nor does any

averment in respondents' complaint so tie in or make appellant as
a party or contractual
property acquired

~ta

thrid party to the respondents said real
Exhibit A.

The four (4) counts set forth in the

respond~nts'

complaint

seek per I.C. 6-401, et seq quiet title to "the Ulrich Property
Easement',' and that its "dominant and superior to any right, title,
claim or interest held by Defendants in the Bach Property"; peJ£
\ GC:HJNT''

r:~

J:n· Gouht/' X';E\ -respondents seek per Ir,;c. 10-1201 et seq
2

''a declaratory judgment against Defendants declaring that
Fllaintiffs are entitle to a declartory judgment against

Def~

endants declaring that Plaintiffs' right, title, claim and
interest 1n the Ulrich Property Easement is dominant and
supeiior to any right , title, claim or interest held by
Defendants in the Bach Property,'' c·R 95)
Respondents' COUNT I:II ;ts labelled PPRELI'MJ'NARY' INJUNCTION"
and averred:
Plaintiff Thomas H. Ulrich telephonedBllahhc::,rg_n_t_~pli:il
24. 1010 to inform him that survey·ors would be presentc::,rg_n
the Ulrich Property Easement to s~rvey the easement to
prepare for the im~rovements.
·

"16.

17. Bach repeatedly insisted that Plaintiffs have no easement
abd threatened Plaintiff£ Thomas H. Ulrich that if survey·ors
entered onto the easement th{:l,t he would call the sheriff.' s
office and charge the surve y·ors with trespassing.

18. Any such interference and/or resttiction of the Ulrich
Property Easement will cause irreparable harm and injury
to Plaintifffs. Plaintiffs are in the process of obtaining
an approval for development of a subid:vision from Teton
County and such process requires the Sl..HVey' and improvement
of the Ulrich Property Easement. Through this process, Plain"
tiffs are subjectto upcoming deadlines before which the sur,-.
vey· of the Ulrich Propery' Easement must be completed. J:f
Pl~intiff cannot obtain ~ survey of the Ulrich Property Ease~en~
ment prior to such deadlines,"Plaintiffs will be unable to
complete their subdivision application and will be irreoar"
ably harmed.
19, Plaintiffs are entitled during the pendency of this act"
tionto a temporary restraining order and/or pr~liminary in,..
junctionemjoining and restraining the De.fendants .fr~m'rdnter,..
~ering with in any manner and/or re~tricting the usage of
the Ulrich Property Easement as a means of ingress and egress
from the Ulrich Property, including but not limited to any
interference w·i th the survey•ing of the Ulrich property· Ease,..
ment forpurpose of improving the ease:ment in the future.'"

C_rR: 06,..07)
Count IV of the complaint averred/sought a :Per:manent inJ unc,..
t ion, and? w·i thout any other Couh t nu:rnb·er ~ l?laiht_iff§
3

sought

tJDJ

recover their reasonable

attorney:~s

fees and costs per

I.C. 10-12-10, 12-121, and I.R.C.P. Rules 54(d) and 54(e).
Also on August 31, 2010, Respondents

filed~a

(R:

07)

MOTION

FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, based upon the purported verified
compliait, with a discussed date with the district court
judge such motion would be heard ptember 7, 2010.

(R: 015718)

But Plaintiffs and their attorneys failed to have Appellant
personally saerved, nor did they attempt to serve nor ever serve
amy of the jmint venturers named in Exhibit B of their complaint.
Respondents appeared before the district judge on September
7, 2010, no reporter was present to record the proceeding,
but the court's minutes revealRespondents' attorney admitted
that no personal service had been made upon Appellant Bach,
claimed his clients had a "P&Z issue" which required resolution,
"all submitted by next week (or) would miss October hearing date."
The district court held there was "No showing of immediate and irrec-""
parable 1o s s if not decided in the next 10 days" & set a pre 1 imi·"-nary injunction hearing on September 17, 2010 at lOa.m.

(R~

019)

September 9, two days after the hearing of Sept 7, respondents filed a MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

(R:

20-22)

On September 16, 2010 Appellant made a Special Appearance,
Contesting Lack of Personal Service and Personal Jurisdiction
via twO (2) filed documents:
1.

2.

MOTION FOR IRCP, Rule 12(b) (2) (4) (5); Rule 3(a) (1);
Rule 3(b); Rule 4(d) (1), Etc., to Strike, Quash
and/or Void Any Purported Service Upon Him, For
Sanctions Against Plaintiff(s) and Counsel.
MOTION TO PEREMPTORILY DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE GREGORY
MUELLER, PER I.R.C.P. Rule 40(d)(l) (A) (B).

4

(SPECIAL NOTE:

The foregoing two two (2) motions filed by

Appellant September 16, are attached hereto as Augmented
Clerks Transcripts, which per
Rules 30(a), Rule

30~}

Mo[t,ion~·tor- be-

·-macae: via .I. A. R.. ·~. ·

30.2 and 32(c) (d), are referenced/iden-

tifies hereafter as "Aug R;"(then the page::;or-pages where they
are inserted, can be found or disclosed.)
As part of Appellant's Special

appearanc~

motion, were

two affidadivts, one of Gary Brett Byington, Ammon,

Idaho, who

was asked by Appellant to take care of Appellant's "animals,
horses, dogs,etc., while (Appelili.ant) went to Southern California
for a personal family trip and occasion'', but Brett Byington had
not nor did not "ever reside, dwell or live in Teton County" 1
with

Appellant on the two dates and occasions, that a purported

neighbor handed

to Brett

Appellant's

:;~.U1pposedly

large white postal priority sealed envelope.

mail in a

Brett Byington

was "not empowered nor authorized to open" such envelope and
left it for Appellant.

(Aug,'R:

Per Appellant's INITIAL MEMORANDUM,

in support of his

specially appearing motions, he cited two (2) Idaho Supreme Court
cases:>which required the "VOIDING" of such inadequate· personal
service efforts, to wit:
647

Herr~Y

(2009) and Marcd Distrib.,

P.-d 393 (1976).

V. Estay 146 Idaho 674, 201 P3d
Iti~.

v. Riehl 97 Idaho 853, 555

Appellant also argued in said initial memora-

ndum that respondents violated IR

:·cp,

RulE'.:~

65 (AfO) required

as due process and equal protection rights of Appellant, citing
Lawrence Wholesale Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co. 89 Idaho 389, 405 P. 2d .)
634.

(Aug.R:
5

On September 17, 2010 at 1);)5 a.m.

before the

district court judge, all motions cam for hearing.
mo court reporter was present, the minutes of
are set forth at
a full hearing

(R: 23-28.

~aid

As
proceedings

Appellant requested ("wanted")

as to motion on special appearance.

( R:

28

Respondent's attorney asked permission to have court bailiff
persoanly serve Appellant with purported pleadings (handed to
bailiff in a sealed envelope, which remained unopened until
the bailiff placed the envelope in front of appellant.
lant objected to such irregular service (''R: 24).

Appel-

Even the

judge did not see/know but assumed what was in sealed envelope.

C:R: 25-26)
The district court judge would

notaacep~t·

appellant's

peremptory disqualification of him, and proceeded asking questions to determine whether as such judge, being disqualified,
such disqualification motion was.tohinder, delay or obstruct
justice ..,

The judge found that such "mot ion was timely and appe 1~Sucfi

lant was entitled to relief."

judge disqualified himself

per IRCP, Rule 40(d) (1) and recessed the hearing! (''R : 27-28)
An ORDER OF DISQUALIFICATION was filed September 17,
2010, but no time-i of its filing was entered.

CfR: 29) On

September 20, 2010 an ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT was entered:;t ,fhe case
referred to the Honorable Darren B. Simpson, Distrid:t Judge
for fur:ther proceedings.
ney for respondent
dency of

Actiou)(~R:

(TR: 31)

On September 21, 2 010, at tor-

filed a recorded LIS PENDENS (Notice of Pen32-34)

No copy of said Lis Pendens was

mailed, nor served upon appellant.
6

EArly

afternoon~

Appellant, specially appear1ng,

a "NOTICE OF MOTIONS and MOTIONS
':WT'IJH'='PREJUID ICE,

re:

filed:

1. MOTION TO DISMISS

IRCP, Rule 12 (b) ( 6) , etc. , ; 2. MOT ION FOR SUM-

M·.RY JUDGMENT, IRCP, Rule 56(b) (c);

3.

Alernatively, MOTION

FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, Rule 12 (c); &: MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS,

COSTS AND FEES AGAINST PLAINTIFFS and THEIR COUNSEL, Rule ll(a) (1),
ALL FOREGOING MOT IONS RE REQUESTED SUA SPONTE .,"not(ifc~g:'ffoT: Oct. 15.

(Aug'.c~~~

The last paragraph of said Notice of Motions stated;
"Defendant also moves hereby to strike any motion for preliminary injunctions, etc., as presented, fnffa . . (as) no
viable claims, no verification exists nor is basis presented,
(no)aadrnissilbe or probative evidence was ever presented
to have allowed Judge Moeller to consider issuing·dOI)Y OSC re
temporaryrestraining orderss ket akibe even hearinga:my request
for preliminary injunction." (Aug'"~:
Within the memorandum Appellant further raised:
"Foremost. equitable jurisdiction (quiet title1injunctive
relief) will not be accorded, nor considered as within the
jurisdiction of this Court 'when anadequate legal remedy is
available.'
Iron Eag!~- Development, LLC v. Quality D~si~ns
Systems, Inc. 134 Idaho 357, 65 P.3d 509, 514 (2009) . . ":'Aug
·_R:

Appellant's p()irited 1outr. :Respondent's Exhibit A was not not4nized by
the designated trustee and was void; concluding: respondents "cannot
comply with the pleading and evidentiary requirements. ¢i t_ing Read
v. Harvey (2009) 147 Idaho 364. (Aug 'R:
Appellant's memo-:randum lastly objected to and a'l:'gged
that "ThiilReis no probable, nor credlble basis nor foTmal
offer of proof by plaintiffs •• ,to show their standing, cap~
acities nor NON running of all statutes of ftaua;t::ldr:Fnitations,
collateral estoppel issue and claim preclusions, etc, As a
matter of fact and law, the present filing of such complaint
is in bad faith, (with) unclean hands and flagrant legal
ethical misconduct." (Aug.]~:
The district court's Minutes of the hearing on motions,
before Judge Darra;ro B. Simpson; such 'Minutes are
inCR:

35~48)

origin3,1

;,~s

set forth

At the outset of the hiarlng, cotild not find an

order~.,."order

is not 1n original court file not in is it
7

1n the £ile that maintain(ed) in Bingham County nor does it
it has been entered in the ROA." C R: ,36)

a~pear

After further review of the clerk's court file, arguments
o£

w~e~her

affiant was personally served and considering the

Affidavit of Linday Moss, the court decide that ''Return of
vice

appearsto comport so is determination

S~r-

(Appellant) was

in fact served with the documents" with the judge deciding "will
hear in objection to Storer's motion".(',R: 37-38)

Without any

testimony respondent's counsel argued the introduction of his
then marked EXHIBITS, A, with new added page, B and D, etc, which
respondent's counsel argued: "does not go to adimissibility-not
revelant"

Relevant to preliminaryinjunction; grantee jjsjslightly

different."

C R: 39-40) Another Exhibit PX C "offered for ill us t rat ion

;~pur.poses,

appellant objected "not illustration of anything that has

/;been resolved-to set out road that isn't there,'' also "Lack of
foundation" but respondent's counsel states that "red dotted line
illustrates the easement"; the Judge admitted said Exhibit PX C
for illustrative purposes without even hearing any testimony,
foundational showing

nor~credibility

to admit.

(~R:

40)

In the testimony presented via by the only witness called
by

respcnden~;:

Michael Quinn, professional engineer; and during

the questioning, objections and answers of Micha§l Quinn, Appellant "m0ves for an orEier and Judgment of Dismissal of request for
preliminary~ii;tjunction."

(R::, 41-43)

Appellant frequently objected

to theotestimony on the basis of no subject matter jurisdiction,
statute of limitations of 5 years and respondent having "adequate
remedies at law".

(':R: 44) Appellant wanted a bond of$100,000.00

if preliminary injunction is granted and striking of
ordered injunctive orders protecting is propertyo
8

pres~tly~

C,'R:

4'5_~46)

-~.

On October 29, 2010 at 1:59 p.m., a MEMORANDUM DECISION
re: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIN AND DENYING
BACH'S MOTION 'IFO.DISMISS, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION
FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, and MOTION FOR SANCTION, COSTS AND
FEES, of 25 pages

(~R:

47-73) along with/attached

there~o

EX-

HIBIT A, being an ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF WAYNE DAWSON'S MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, in Teton CV 2001-265, filed October
2~,

2010at 1:04 p.m, of 21 pages (' R: 73-94) and EXHl3BIT B, being

a copy of SECOND AMENDED aUDGMENT, in Teton CV 2001-265, filed
October 29, 2010 at 1:04 p.m., of 3 pages) ( R: 95-99) were filed.
Also on October 29, 2010 at 4:19p.m. an ORDER GRANTING

n

PRELIMIARY INJUNCTION was filed (TR:l00-104), teo (2) minutes
after it was signed by Judge Simpson. ( R: 103)
~CDTE:!:

These two documents, said MEMORANDUM flee is ion and ORDER

GRANTING PRELIMIANRY INJUNCTION, are two (2) challenged errors
on/in thLs Appeal and will be addressed, infra, in detail and
specificity .

r

On November 16, 2010, at 4:44p.m., Appellant filed
his VERIFIED ANSWER AND
(TR: 105-115)

COUNTERCL~JMS,

conssiting of 11 pages.

Per said VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS, appel-

lant prefacing paragraph stated:
"COMES NOW JOHN N. BACH, still preserving all special
h~fdih ~~d~, ahd i§§efting Nis opposiiton and
objections to the sub~ect~matter and personal jurisdictions
claimed and even temporarily found by the court applying
herein, and does hereby, alternatively answer, deny and
oppose the purported singularly verified complaint by solely
Plaintiff Thomas H. Ulrich, who is without standing, capacity
or validity to speak for, act or represent his claimed wife,
MARY' M. ULRICH, as not (in) compl:iimce on her behalf per the
Idah() Satute of"Frauds, written power of attorney or agency,
h~s been stated, ~ma;de ~:( cohta±r:ed any,wHe:re, w·ith.in sa):d compl ,,
a :tnt as presently, on f:t le here :tn. (.'R: 10 5)
A~~~atAhc~$

9

.

,

hJ~

Un(i$,r

a,ns:we;rs, paragraph "A. DENTAL OF GENERAL

II

ALLEGATIONS'''-'~ a,ppel,la,nt hr/pe.r his suo sequent paragraphs 1 through

4

CJR;

deny· all allegations of respondents' complaint.

1QS,.1,071

t>er the lP;st ,f!;ppellant!·s statement in his:::;pargraph 5 and his
parag.raph 5
;c

~

followin$ he denies '•'that THOMAS H. ULRICH

or his

.>> hi-sino:nappea·ringw-i£e,clhit:ye any·.;rights,

entitlement or claims/
causes of ac~ion for relief or redress as sought per para. graphs A, B, C, D, E, P & G of his said prayer.
5. Ans·we.ring , opposing and objecting to the purported
V.f3J\:£F+;CAT:CON, of' the complaint on page 9, · thereof, denies and
objects Ctol each contended compliance statements and/or that
form and ~ma,nne.r of notarization, is inaccurate and incorrect
C_notl pe.rsonal knowledge of Thomas H. Ulrich." C R: 107)
Appe llP,nt

13ACH .AND

~

per his paragraph ''B. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO

ALL COUNTS r, TI, TI·I & IV 11 , sets forth in 13 subpara-

graphs hi.s affir:ma,ti-ye defenses.

(TR: 107·:-.113) (The veri:fi®d ave1:--

ment$ o£ a,ppel1,ant in his paragraph "B'', subpararaphs of: "B, 4,"
(S t at u t e o f. F r 13, u d s l

;

1

'

B , 5" CS t a tu t e o f L im i tat ions ) ; "B , 6" (fa i 1 -

ure of compliance with L

c.

S- 238}; '·'B, 7" (1 iab i 1 i ty of acts,

conduct and d$ceptive -representations and barred per respondents
doctrine of la,ches1; '''·B, 8,'' Cunclean hands, unw·illingess to do
ecpitity

~

failure to comply w·ith express and implied covenants,

duties P,nd obligP,tions· o.f good faith, fair dealings and lack of
eyasions,. deceptions a,nd untruthfulness of averments, etc.,
ftJ.ythe.r
delinea,ted in sub.paragraphs El) thil.ough f)
,.,...
"B,lO,

'~application

as

C R: 116-117);

of adverse possession, prescriptive.:use and

restriciions, the plaintiffs accepted, agreed to and did bind,
commit and obligated themselves to the complete ownership • . of John
..

N. BACR. ' ·4 are 'averred moreJGompletal 21 : ih,/:R,~ 10~~1-~.~Jl.]:.) • )
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Appellant's
affirmative defenses

paragraphs

~B,

11, 12

st~ted/averred

& 13,

of his

under penalty of perjury

of his own personal knowledge that:
"li. As a direct, legal and resulting application of the
foregoing affirmative defenses, per paragraphs B. 1, through 10, supra, plainti(ffs) and each of them , alterna~
tively , jointly and most restrictively, are subject to the
doctrines of: (a) promissory estoppel; b) estoppel in pais;
c) quasi-estoppel; d) waiver or abandonment, and/or extinquishment of any',cla±ms' or rights to be asserted for any 60
foot acess-egress or any other use easement across not just
the most westerly portions of said 40 acres but not any ease ...t::~ci:':
~ents, prescritpive rights, privileges or uses over or upon
the entire 40 acres, which said 40 acres were not only substantially fenced, enclosed and physically barred fro~:access,
but earning, no trespassing signs, violators would be prosecuted and those that survivied would be shot agarn, were constantly and continoulsy posted and replaced.
12. There is another legal actions pending, not yet finalized as to the most current ruling and second judgment rendered 1n Teton CV 01-265, which deals most directly and immediated of the possible further claimants of ownership to said
40 acres and said contended plaintiffs' right to a 60 foot
westerly easment. Such litigation and ruling/second judgment
have been served upon plaintiffs herein, but they have shown
no concern of the legal effects and controlling aspects of said
Teton CV 01-265 nor hHve plaintiffs made any efforts to serve
not just such named parties in Teton CV 01-265, (which) are
indispensible parties, among such being Milan~~4ndiDiafi~9/V~-~~ch
Cheyovich, who in said T~ton CV 01-265 are stated to own an
undivided one-fourth ownership is said 40 acres.
Until such
service of indispensible parties is accomplised and this action
is consolidated with Teton CV 01~265, this court will be severely prejudiced, and the rights of defendant herein further
prejudicially unresolved with finality.
Due to the current
lack of service upon ibdispensible parties known to plaintiffs
and the lack of consolidation and joinder herewith of this act~
ion and Teton CV 01-265, defendant reserves unto himself further rights of amendments to these affirmative defenses and
nhe counterclaims which he, infra, avers.
13. Defendant prays that plaintiffs are precluded from continuing in any capacities or standing with this lawsuit until
thet~have ser~ed all indipsensible parties and filed approp~
riate motions for joinder of thhir claims to that of Teton
CV 01-265 and then,~in such event, they be granted :ab.sdJutcly
no relief, legal or equitable, no costs, no award of attor~~ys
neys fees, and that they and their counsel ~e sanction(ed)
for violations of Rule ll(a)(l) and JL1(<{}(B)(2) and per the
inherent powers of this court for pursuing a specious, fri~
volous, vexatious and without merit lawsuit.''
[ R: 112-114)
11

Besides the foregoing affirmative defenses put squarely
1n issue by appellant's verified answer and
defenses,

a£firmatiu~n

his "C. COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS"

,

(.R: 113-

116) appellant incorporated by reference per paragEaph "C, 1,
p~r

I.R.C.P, Rule 13(a)

(and also Rule lO(c),) all of his

statements and averments of his

Parag~aphs

A. 1, through 5,

B., 1 through 13, as part of his Statemens Facts, per Rule 8,
est seq and Rule 9(c)(d), et seq against
counsel, surveyors and consultants."

C R:

~~11

plaintiffs, their

113)

Under, and per appellant's verified paragraphs "C., 4.,
through 6. ,

C R: 114-115) he set forth more spec i fie counter-

claims/counts seeking recover,

qu~et

title and damages, to

wit~:

"3.
Counterclaim JOHN N. BACH has been defrauded, deceived and had his property and portions ahdY~i~hts of possession, use, occupancy and quiet maintenance, coverted, destroyed and trespassed by each and both of the plaintiffs
for which he seeks full fuonetary and comperisatory damages,
4.
Counterclaimant JOHN N. BACH seeks an order for quiet
title com~letely tohimself on/as to anu such claimed 60
foot easement by plaintiffs, the entire remaining 40 acres,
to which/but only an undivided xh:reer::fiuurthoownership is to be
confirmed and to no'1.one else.

Sf. Counterclaimant JOHN N. BACH,seeks damages and other
injunctive/equitable relief for the plaintiffs and each of
their breached of the implied/express covenants of good
faith and fair dealings, finding further that per the equitable doctrines set ofrth in the foregoing incor.porated affirmative defenses, plaintiffs are barred by each, all or any of
said defenses.and are precluded from continuing with their
counts herein or any other legal action seeking to deprive
counterclaimatnt of any right, title, ownership or interests
oth~r than as he has averred, seeks and requests relief from
this Court.
6.
Counterclaimant incorpoates all of the paragraphs C., 1
through 5, supra herein and seeks that he be awarded damages rr
and ameliorat@ry relief for the intentional interence, by
plajmtfffs of his existing contractual rights with the Cheyovichs
and others, his prospective and economic relations and advantages, developments, etc., of said 40 acres he has lost or
sustained by plain~iffs/counterclaim defendants ULRICH's tortious conduct."
C R: 114)
12

Appellant's prayer and verification are set forth in
TR: 114-115)
(SEE NOTE 1, infra.)
~e~pondents''

REPLY TO cou:tHERCLAl¥. was filed Dec, 3,

URi 116·d2ll

2010,

A MINUTE

ENTR~

was £tled January 11, 2011 at 4;49 p.m,

rea Jan, J, 2011 Telephone Status Conference, all ;parties
he,rein appearing:telephonically, wherein the district court
set the pretrial Condernce fo,r Priadya, May 6, 20llat 1:30 p.m.
and

11

the Court Trial lasting for three (31 days from June 8,

2011 thourgh June 10, 2011, both hearings to be heard in Teton
County! 1.'' CR; 122.,-.124}
On March 12, 2011, Respondents

l·

M.OT(I)ON .FOR SUMMARY JUDG-·

MENT was filed? supported by Th.oms H. Ulrich1·s Affidavit 1n
SUJ?POI\T'plus the '.Memorandum
AFF~DAYJ:T

The

OF TIJOJ1AS H.

(6)_ e;xhil}its, to wit:

filed therewith.
UL~}'Cf;t;:~·

CR:

115-118} ;:

h;i,d attached to it,

Exhibit A, copy

~Jof::a

deed transferring

title to the Ulrich Property, as defined in the Verified
Sarasqu~ta

from P,hi:l t:P J.

and Mar i ly·n

~R,

t5Jx•:c:

~arasqueta,

Complaint

husband

and wife, and Louisa S, Saraqueta, Trustee of the Sarasqueta

Liv~

Ing Tr1;1.st, dated October 30, 1990 to Thomas H. Ulrich and M,ary·
Ulrich, husb-and and wife;n.

Exhibit B, a copY' of deed transferring

title to an additional 30 acress of properY', adjacent and conti"
\'

," '.'

..

,.

..

NOTE 1; J1;1.ly' 26-~ 2010 AJ?pe11ant received an ORDER, in Supreme Court, DKT
NQ, 39318,2011 Teton CO'!) No 2010-329 denying .lids Petition/Motion 'For I:mpos;;.,
ing Extraordinary Appell~te Procedure, 't .A~ R~ R;ytle 42, J0INING and CONSOLJ'D-.
ATJ'N.€1, 1\B:I?EA.L OOCKET NO, 393:£8.,..2011~ TETON CV'"2010.,-.329, Appellant in Supreme
Court DocRet Nos 33370·-2010~ has £Ned a Petition for :Rehearing and submitted/
;filed aM,ernorandtlTil Brief in Support thereof; appellant therein has raised,
a:r~ed and suom~tted that J]iudge Da~ren B! Simpson, neither had the jurisdicttlon~any authorized or empowered d1scret1on toenter Octo 29, 2010 his SEGGNB
AMENDED JUDGMENT therein. There is no final decision/order in;said Dkt 38370-2010.
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grantors as EXHIBIT A, to both respondents as husband and
wife); Exhibit C was a copy of title insurance (o£ Exhfubit
A real propertyJ which was dated Dec. 11 15 19_96,') HJ;aJ:mrwhich~e:x'cluded "4. Lack of a right of access to and from the land'o';
Exhibit D, ancopy of title insurance f of Exhibit B.real
property) which was dated Dec. 11, 1996, 10:07 a.m, wfuid'lexcluded
"4. Lack of a right of acess to and from the land'.'; Exhibit
E, copy of a deed from
husband and

wi~e

T~ton

West

Cor~oration

and the trustee (predecessors

to the Sarasqueta,
intetes~

to the

Sarasquet-a:t Living Trust dated June 9,, 1994, BUT NOT RECORDED
AS INSTRUMENT 116576, on nJUN 17, 1994";

and Exhibit F, copy of

CORPORATION WARRANTY DEED, dat.ed "JUN 14, 1994",

as.

INSTRUMENT

116461, from TETON WEST CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation,

doing bsuiness in Idaho, (transfering the 40 acres parcel,
identified as PEACOCK PARCEL, to: "JACK LEE McLEAN, Trustee
of the JACK LEE McLEAN FAMILY TRUST, as to an undivided
one-fourth interst' MILAN CHEYOVICHand DIANA CHEYOVICH,
Trustees of the CHEYOVICH FAMILY LRUST, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; WAYNE DAWSON, Trustee of the
DAWSON FAMILY TRUST, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; and TARGHEE POWDER EMPORIUM, LTD, as to an undivided one-fourth interest . • "
(NOTE 2.)
(' R: 135-164)
CNOTE

"2':~·

respondents 1 mot1on for summary Judgment dJ:d not seek

any summary judgment

on the affirmative defenses and counter-

claims raised by Appellant's verified ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS:
rather in the last paragraph 4, by respondentssthey

asked~

"For an Order from the Court dismissing all of Defendant John
N. Bach's counterclaims against Plaintiffs", without submitting
any notice of hearing on such ambiguously phrased request for
dismissal and without and submitted any points or authorities
to grant such motion to dismiss which was way dilatory to make
14

under I . R • C. l? , , Ru 1 e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) . )

( TR : 1 2 6 ) In fact , the I as t ~

full paragraph of tespondents' motion for summary judgment,
did not mention at all or submitta memorandum on any motion
to dismiss. · R: 127)

March 25, 2010 Appellant filed his AFFIDAVIT . . RE OBJECTIONS AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
consisting of 12 pages ( R: 168-179) to which were attached:
EXHIBIT 1., certified c6pies of a JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT AND
LIMITED POWERS OF ATTORNEY TO CLOSE ESCROW,

entered into by

the four joint venturers owners via their family trusts and
appellant's business name Targhee Emporium Emporium, Ltd.,

(~R:

180-

183) which was recorded Jun 14,1994, at 4L30 p.m.; EXHIBIT 2,
a copy dated Aprilc2009 of "IMPROVEMENT PLANS FOR GROUSE LANDING
TETON COUNTY,JIDAHO" prepared for respondents, showing an already
existing 60 foot county road and utility easement, to the NorthWest corner of respondents approximate 39 acres, 1and such 60
foot County road and utility easementsoutherly aleng/into
respondents said 39 acres for approximately 3/4s of its length;
(vR: 184); and EXHIBIT 3 ,

#p~~@~

6£ six (6) cblored photo-

graphs showing the fencing, enclosing fences, keept out and
no trespassing signs, restrictions and planted trees and

~ates

along the western and and around the appellant's said 40 acres
known as Peacock Propertv.put up since its purchase in June/July
1994 and in place when and after respondents came to visit
appellant and nis wife, in late summer 1994, which remain in
place to this very date.(' R: 186-189)
The following
Affidavit.

·l•s.t!~~~s-·arE: outlined facts of appellant's
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OUTLINES OF APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVIT
Par .11: He's only defendant/counterclairnant served by respond-,,
ents; his V:erilified A(NSWERO& 'MANDATORY COUNTERCLAIM is
incorporated. (' R: 169)
Par 2:

No affidavit from Mary M.Ulrich; no power of attorney
nor written authority for her llwibl:rndl·to'biml<twr. C'l~; ·169) ·

Paro 3:

Attached Deft Exh. "1 ',' certified copy of Teton Insrument No. 11642, ent:ttiled "JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT and
LT POWERS OF ATTORNEY TO CLOSE ESCROW, incoupora ted. (' .R: 169)

Par 4:

Since purchase of 40 acres, kmrwn as "PEACOCK 40 Acre
Parcel", he's been controlling owner, manager, residential occupier, with street address: 4000N, 1520E,
Tetonia, but mailing address of P.O. Box 101, Driggs,
I D 8 3 4 2 2 . (T'R: 17 0)

Par 5.

Peacock Parcel plus a 8.5 acre parcel, re known.as
Zamona Casper llircel. currently sftbject of pending appeal,
(Dkt No. 38370-2010), whereillrr1 Judge Simpson rendered Oct. 29,
2010, a OHDER/\GRANTDNG rPJ.::A~INl'IFF WAYNE DAWSON'S MOTION FOR RELTIEF
FROM JUDGMENT (21 pages) and SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT (2 pg)(R: 170)

Par. 6:

The Appeal in 38370-2010, per the foregoing ORDER GRANTING WAYNE
DAWSON's MOTIONFOR RELIEF fROM JUDGMENT and SECOND AMENDED ,TIJDGMENT
rendered without notice and holding of any hearing, thus violating
appellant's rights, and is "unfathomable and impermissible", revealingJudgeSimpson's nonjurisdictional, wilful deliberate misstatements
per said ORDER and SECONDED AMENDED JUDGMENT, per Idaho statutes and
U S, Federal 'Supreme Court standards of both the actual presence of
b1as and the reasonable man appearances of his bais againsat appellant.
No appeal ever filed , nor could it be, that the ORDER dismissing
Wayne Dawson's and Jack McLean's complaint, in Teton CV 01-265, with
B.rejudice, can now w±thout any subject matter jurisdiction, being final
Judgment, b~, in this action. be redone or modified, where such
is nonexistent procedure,. CR: 170-172)

Par 7:

Judge Simpson's inappropriate evaluation of Affiant's appeal rights
in 38370-2010, his actions, stiatemetns and evaluations, all incorrect
in said appeal, 0 are not merely appearances of prejudice but actual
prejudices, extra judicial and without jurisdiction, which require
:his disqualification and recusal, as matter of law and imdenialable
facts, nunc pro tunc, herein. ('TR: 172)

Par 8:

Before appellant's and joint venturer's purchase of Peacok Parcel
he with Jack McLean --& · Joilll J3r-e~-vBr reali:t\ht for Trout Teton Ranch·,_and
'Dhe:FAmily Hatch Trust, walked along.westerly boundary of 40 acre
parcel saw in place, above gronnd an east valley eibectricity trunk
:.ldme all along westerly boundary, which along with telephone utlity
service "already in place for the land uses to north'.and west of
PeacoG:k 40 acres pracel and to the North of it. CR:. 172)

Par.9:

Just to the NW. of Peacock Parcel, within 100 feet, was a large
16

electricirrigation pump accesible vla an easement eminating from
(county) road SOON; this easement did not go/nor extend to
any part of Pear:ock Parcel. Upon terms of purchase of Peacock,
(as in EX. : ) l'R: 180-182) Affiant "erected barriers and posted
signs-:; along I\TIV covners, Nly boundary, SW comderaand SW corner
& Sly boudar;r; . of "NO Access allowed", "No TRESPASSING!,(, "Keep
OUT", \Tand "NO HUNTING";fftom thereon, affiant woilild twice monthly
check and maintain tfue access barriers and warning signs. Winter
snow depths on said Peacok parcel, were 24-30 inch depts; no trees
no wind barriers on 40 acres until June, 2004. ~ R: 172-173)
Par 10:

The claimed easement of access Mong inside Westrly boundary of
Peacock, was per the advis of realtor Johnf Brewer, which "was to
protect the 4 j 6.int ventuers personal2c&c. their trust's development
of their indifrisihles.:&~.::, undivided one-quarter ovmership, to especially
comply with then Teton County's newly being formulated zonging and
planning code re family owned land splits. No understanding was
reached of a 60 foot easment, either with said Joint Ventue·:of
Spendthrift Trusts, nor was any 60 ft easement every agreed "to
access any land or parcels north of or adjacent to the North of
Peacock',' which Peacock Parcel did not haveany· irrigation rights
granted to it via the large agricultural well, nor from Hogg
Canal furtherly north of it, nor from South Leight Creek branch
going SWly into/becoming Dry Creek or Bear Creek. (R: 174

Par 11:. There was not any Ulrich Easement existing as contended by Plaintiffs, Attached EX. 2, solely for illustrative purpose is a 4/ZZ/09
drawing of plaintiff's engineers for Grouse Landing, which
reveals plaintiffs' parael ;was already accessed Jlr'ia roads and
utilties, underground, via roads in place to it, by owners/developers
sfi£EWJ\tERTRANCH . SUBDIVISION~, (from county road SOON). . 'R: 174)
Par 12:

Affiant did know of respodents until late July/early August2004,
when they drove up 400N onto the raadaalong affiant's Southern
boundary (called Summit View) ('R: 8)

Par 13.

On their:: first meeting plaintiffs drove paat wooden posts~ rails an:::.
and existing gate with "No Trespassing , Keep Out and Stay oOmt, etc.
signs posted by affiant, Steve Ulricha::;asRedfCJ~· permission to travel
over the easterly portion of Peacock so as to reach some 6plus dou~
ble high beehives, llXJica,teld:. Uin J:b.iddle of Ulrich 1 s p[roperjzy which
was in a Dept of Agriculture CRP progam~, "Affiant only gave very
restricted access verbal1 withdrawable at any time, and only when
Ulrich would stop and ask again"for such permission from affiant or
his wf£e. No other person were given "such restrictive and limited
access." Mfiant had in place his obstructingfences, rails, barriers
and gateswith No Trespassing signs/warnings." ('R: 176)

Par 14:

On this initial meeting .and during plaintiffs' mid to late summer

visits, Affiant informed plamntffs he. woult not allow any other
access and told plaintiffs of several civil action involved in
that he obtained injunctions against various defendants, who had
trespass over first 100 feet of hfus westerly boundary and he would
be installing more permanent and secure gates \{li({'ft said 100 feet
.. 1:7,.

~

H

to protect hiw wife and hfumself ~ as,rthey had been threatened to
be severly, threatened to oe :Killed, beaten or · maimed by
various defendants in existing lawsuits. Plaintiffs ,made no
objections nor any opposition to affiant's access restriction,
barriers, fences or gates~~-Plliaintiffs used animal trails to reach
their beehives, within an hour or so, the left going past then
existing fence 15anriers and warning signs. C-R: 01761
·r

Par, 15: Through SUJT111ler of 2008,. plaintiffs twice visited the.ir beehives,
"alwaysstopping at Affiant 1·s ·mooilehome to ask permission, ~m~l •
le9,ving honEil;y, filled. trays for· AFfiant and his wife',' During these
stops:~ ''plaintiffs both would ask questions arid inquire abou,t the
permaent injunctionAffiant had obtained against such threatening
defendants in the pending TEton civil actions, By 'May 2006, affiant
had erected ,more pennanent 15arriers, placed signs, planted trees, ,.
shrubs and positioned large :rod<s oostacles and barriers, etc,,
(Described are no of fences, sight and winde barrirs, gates, ,
ski~ ~etc) In last 2008 visit
a.1lred signs with some 20.,..30 pairs
by Plaintiffs asked affiant how· severe winters were and travel
concerns if they proceeded to build a vacation home on their
parcel;.nhat Mr.· Barlow, developer of S:ftillwater Subdivsions, to
west and north of their property·· ;;''had provided several co,rrjplete
ac{;~~i:ble roads cmd complete unaerground utilities/services to
h.
thel:!' parcel, frQJ1LB.oad SOON, with further access through and via
other subdivisions."· Plaintiffs never discussed any cormnercial or
subdivsion plans or implementations thereof, on their property but
"only for their personal seasonal'/vacatmon home. (.R: 176~ 177)

of

Par 16; I:n late June, 2009, Affiant visited in front of fuis mobile home
byThomas Ulrich,· in full view of all of all such improvements, fences"; .gates~ ba:hriers and no trespassing signs, etc. Ulrich inquired
if affiant would "agree to grant him a 25-30 easement of access
only within Affiant's westerly boundary to an area on his parcel where
he wanted to build a seasonaJJ residence." Affiant said "NO~ r;r and
told Ulrich he already· had access from SOON, renumbered SOOON,
questions Ulrich'' s reasons and motives .. for 25~30 easement request,
stating '!stating in no uncertain terms, • there was no easement nor
would he consider such requested 25-.30 foot easement." (.'R 1778178)
Par 17; Attached are several co lor phots CExhi bt 3 attached) whic depict and . accurately' reveal appearances of "most southwesterly fences, signs,'
barriers,· etc. which Thomas Ulrich saw on his said June 2009 visit.
On said June 2009 visit by Ulrich,~discussed with Affiant was the
"untimely and wrongful death of Affiant's wife, Cindy, while under
the care of Teton Valley Hospital (in Driggs), her death occuring
J: ;;:·
either on late Nov. 7, or early Nov. 8, 2008," and that "June 28,
~', ,affiant was effected by a stroke, throbotic c6Jjlplete." (:R: 178)
Par 18: Plaintifffs have never given notice <Do affiant of their application
for their residential or other subdivision plan, nor had the Teton
County Plannirgf.bepartment until affiant had been se:rvedo with a notice
of a hearing about a month ago "which never took placeJ' (TR: 178)
Appellant's notarized siggature is set forth on ·lR: 179.
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ISSUES

XN

THIS

APPEAL

L.

LACK OF PERSONAL AND SUBJECT 'MATTER JURISDICTION

2.

COMPLAINT,, S FAILURE T() STATE ANY' CAUSE OF ACTION.

3.

REQUIRED DISQUALI'FICATI0N,RECUSAL OR RBMOVEL
ASSIGNED DISTRICTC00URT JUDGE.

4., ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW (,AMONG CONTUMACIOUS REFUSAL)
BY DISTRICT COURT JUDGE TO 1\EQUI'RE RESPONDENTS TO
PURSUE THEIR AVAILABLE, ADEqUATE AND I'MMEDIATE LEGAL
REMEDIES.

5.

ERRORS, ABWSEi" OF DISCRETION, TO AWARD ANY' ATTORNEY'S
FEES OR COSTS TO RESPONDENTS.

(

',

••

.L< \._
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<

PJ\~Jt];ii~:rtfG

ARGUMENTS TO ALL APPEAL POINTS

Appellant's NOftCE OF APPEAL filed October 24, 2011 was
timely·.

(]\. 272.,..2772

Although the original JUDGMENT

of June

6, 2011 was ·modified by the FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT of October

/

;

__,---'it

2011 extended the June 6, 2011 JUDGMENT to include and provide:
''The Ulrichs 1 shall recover the follow;izng from Bach;
attorney fees in the amount of $25,366.72; costs as a
~atter of right in the amount of $219.0G~. and discretiona.rycosts in the amount of.$35.000.
Such fee· and._
costsamounts, tota.ling $25,628072, shall accrue interest
at the lega.l rate· of interest for judgments fr om the
date of entry· of this First Amended Judgment until such
(lmount, plus accr~ed interest, has been paid in full."
CR• 280, 267.,..272}
R.esponden ts via such. F tRST AMENDED JUDGMENT, along with
WAYNE DAWSON (lnd the very· deceased JACK LEE McLEAN, have in
two (2) a.ppe(lls, Dkt;: 3837,0:-2010 and Dkt;34712-2007 (35334-2008),
along with respondents herein, have taken three (_3) bits of
the festering and regurgitating "apple" of lack of jurisdiction
and ''VOIDNESS."
I~f

!'•"""'"

Just the first two APPEAL ISSUES are decided in

Appellant's fa-yor, reversing the FlRST AMENDED JUDGMENT, including the -very• suspect and frivlous award of attorneys' fees,
costs a.nd any further cited by respondents herein,

then

there will be established that thedistrict court failed to
correctly and leg(llly apply the mandatory

requir~ments

of r.R.C.P,

Rules 56Cal thro-qgh 56(el, that said FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT
and this
a.bly •

A~BEAJL

have not been pursued ;frivolously

B'utter·s· V!' VaTidez

Appella,nt

befor~

(r'd App 2010) 241 P3d 7,

or unreasMoreoever,

the district court and in this Appeal cannot

be shown to ha;ve ''a.cted without a reasonable basis in fact and
law.

H6ffeY V.

~~t1 ~f E6i~e, ffJ~~8
20

2011) 257 P.3d 1226, 1229.

AR~UMENT

L.

AND AUTHORIT1EES RB ISSUES
ON APPEAL

tACK OF PERSONAL AND SUBJECT MATTERS JURISDICTION
The very initial question, as to the standing or capacity

of appellant

is~

IS HE SUED, NAMED AND SERVED AS A SOLE

INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT OR AS ONE OF OTHER JOINT VERTURERS AND
OWNERS OF THE PEACOCK FORTY ACRE PARCEL?
In Exhibit B, attach notarized uppyof a Corporation Warranty
Deed, dated June 9, 1994, from Teton WEST CORPORATION, conveying 40 acres to the there named trustees of family trust, McLean,
Cheyovich and Dawson, and TARGHEE POWDRR EMPORIUM, LTD, each
granted to have and own at that time of acquisition an "undivided one-fourth interest (R:
such grantees are joint

12-14), to respondents' complaint;

ventUilriD'Ii'~,lwh:o:Jare

members, with said

one-qu<itrt::e:rr undivided ownerships in a joint venture assocation.
In appellant's March 25, 2010 filed AFFIDAVIT . . RE OBJECTIONS AND OPPOSITION TO PLAillNTIFF MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
12 pages, (R: 168-179), he attachedas EXHIBIT 1., certified
copies of the JOINT VENTURE AGREEMETN AND LIMITED POJ'\l'EJtS

OF

ATTORNEY TO CLOSE ESCROW, (R: 180-183).
Respondents have never put into

theirfc~~plaint

or Thomas

Uliich's AFfidavit for summary judgment any evidence that appellant was not a joint veturer with siad oth®r three (3) initial
jmint ventuvers.

Respondents' averments in their complaint

is more than specious, stating::·"4. On information and blief,
Bach claims an interst in the following described real proper
located in Teton County, Idaho, and situate to the south of
21

Ulrich Property (the 'Bach Property'

J; "

(R: 3 J

So why wasn't the PEACOCK 40 ERRE Joint venturer pacel
property owners not served with proce§s and made the indispensible party defendants?

Respondents answer is

fofund~

1n

REPLY MEMORANDUM, to their Motionffor summary judgment,
whrein they cited Tower Asset Sub. Tnc.,
1

710 114, that

v.

Lawrence 143 Idaho

'joinder of all parties with an interest in the

subject matter of the suit is not requiredk rather, only
those who have an inter§,sts. ;in; 1-,_the · <?bJe_cts of the suits should
be joined."
di~trict

Respondents blatantly and corruptly ask the

court jtidge to lo6k the other way despite

they~ia~d

"'-Al tough the other pro:Pet:r:t¥/ owners of the Bach i1!'-~l'f!;''W
may have an interests in the subject matter of the suit,
a property owners, only Defendant has attempted to interfeRe with Plaintiffs' interest in the propetty.
Consequently, the other property owners do not have an interest
in the object of the suits.
Therefore, the other owners
om the Bach Proerpty are not indispensble:
parties."
(Supp R; vol ;:009]
But a Joint Venttpne is in the nature of a partnership,
subjeci to the laws of pa.rtnership so far c:g substantival rights
are concerned.

Forbes v. ButTer, 2.42 P.

950, 956;

¥ost imp.,.

ortantly, joint venturers stand in a fiduciary relationship
and duties to each others Boyd V. Head 443 P.2d 473, 92 Idaho
389.

Therefore a joint venture is not an entity separate and

ap:a:rt from the parties campo sing it.
90 rdaho 424, 412 P.2d 597.

Clawson v.

Gen~~"T

Tnsur. Co.

Among the essential elements of a

joint venture is the right of each member to voice, an equal
right of

cont~ol,

v. · NeNabb

of the direction of the enterprise.

514 P.2d 604, 97 Idaho 180.
12

E~st~n

When respondents did not have appellant personally served,

(Page S-7, supra), they also failed to comply with. J4.tt~e!IJ•

Rule 3(b) which mandates/requires

a defendant to be named

"as a person in a representative capacity . . • (he) is made a party
to the action" or in an "action against a partnersip or unincorporated association."
must be complied with.
. ~4Sj,, a<, partmensfuipc;

Also uncfer I.R.C.P., Rule 4(d)(4)(B)
In Legg v

Barina:ga,93&It\Edahocl2~5.,

44-0 PZd,

and individual members thereof were ordered

to be made parties defendant to the action originally· commenced
against one member of the joint venture and no summons was ever
served

o_y,:;anyi:efpthe~·cadded.Jpart:iaslfuor

upon the

partnership~

a valid judgment could not be rendered against the partnership
nor against any individual partner.
It 1s well known by respondents and the±r counsel, that
MiJi® and Diana Cheyo10ich, as an undivided one-quarter owner

of said Paacock Parcel live in Southern Californial

If Wayne

Dawson, is to be still an equal one-quarter owner he lives in
Chico, Northern California, while Jack McLean is deceased and
without any estate of personal representatives, but whatever
daughter of his is still alive, she lives (both of them ):.in
Canada.
Such indispensible parties, per I.R.CP, Rule 19(a)
must be originally named in a new complaint by the resondents
and the present complaint must be dismissed with prejudice.
The foregoing pleading and service of all indispensible
parties. who still may have ownership interests in PeacoGk ,
were known to respondents and most parLKularly Judge Simpson.
They all in vi ted error. State \o. Pentico JGid App2012) 265 P .3d 519, 528-29.
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BlJt did the resondents even have NANM~·- equitable remedies cor ·we_re.:th_e_yrequired to plead whatever counts/claims
ther sought 'a:s legal remedies which were available, adequate
and immediate?
just the

Yes is the Answer, and appellant cited not

Tron· E'asgle' De;v: .. QuaTitY' Designs Systems, Tnc.

134 tdaho 357, 65 P.3d 509, 514,

Gee page 7, supra reasserted

herein in full, but more slgnificarnrtt:lty the follow·ing cases;
1.

Suchan·

:v.

RutherforE:l, 90 Idaho 288,

2Z.

W'a.Tkin· :v,.· J?au1 {Idaho 1973] 511 P. 2d 781, citing and
Suchan V. R.utherforg, supra, ("The basic underlying ~-u1
rule is --equity will not intervene where the aggrieved party has a plain .. , speedy, adequate and complete
remedy at law.")

3.

Gardner v. Fliegal (1969) 92 Idaho 767, 450 P.2d 901
(Although the Idaho Suprme Court held, no on legal
remedies at law dealing with easements, but auxiliary
to that, an "easement is a right in the land of another;
(and) one cannot have an easement in his own land.")
(This case along with others expanding such rule, set
forth, infra, page
, preclude entirely respondents
from even claiming a quiet title, declartory relief
and injunctive relief claims, where they never had
any legal title granted to them over appellant's 40
are Peacok Parcel, respondents never took possession,
nor made any knowledgeable use, management or operation of their contended easement over appellant's
Peacok Parcel, and more signifinantly,
by the Gardner case and those cited, infra, page
, by operation of
law, the doctrine of merger, extinquished and destroyed
an~vri~hts, claims or assertions~ whatsoever, to any
easement across appellant's 40 acre Peacock Parcel.

As will oe cited and ana1;y.t:zed infra,
and

295, 410 P2d 434

dec~ption

respondents deceit

on contrivedly creating a false easement over

the Peacock Parcel, was

in flangrant violation of the Idaho's

Statute of Frauds, I.C, 9-505(4), because "an express grant of
an easement cannot be created
No 131, 119 Idaho

5~4;

br

parol. Abbott v. Nampa Shh Dist

(see infra)
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Respondents complaint and the affidavit of Thomas

uv:i-<itt{

did not plead any justifiable reasons for not

joining and serving all indispenaible parties who
joint venturers with appellant in

Peaco~40

are

Acre Parcel.

•tM:il;'J,n & Dina Chey·ovich were never named nor served)
The obvious reasons ~or a¥oidance to have personal
serv1ce and inclusion of the joint venture in thair lawsuit is that it subjects, particularly Wayne Daw·ron, ··should

.r-aise any- 51ackcb:lfpos s i ble standing or capacity for the
two daughters of

Ja~k

and brought into the

McLean, long

action\~'

deeease~

to be served

.such would insuiee appellant

his due puocess and equal protection, procedural and
substa:i_nt;j;ve.\ rights to bu:n:im;i.p',,

~·or;oss-complaints

and/or

thirdy party complaints, against Dawson and said Mcltlzah ''·s.
daughters, if they still have any standing herein.
The entire complaint as filed and unprovenly persecuted
against appellant herein, reveals the mindset of insurance

legal

policy and possible invol vment of Wayne lla wson and his wife,
Donna Dawson, 3atill defendants, in Teton CV 01-265, which
is still pending before this Idaho Supreme Court per a petition
and submitted memoraridum in supporttthereof, of a petition for
rehearing.
The long delays and stalling/avoidances by this Idaho
Supreme Court, in refusing to

ru1~$?.,

admit and reinstate Judge

Jon Shin±rdling's JOINT MEMORANDUM DECIONS AND QUIETING TITLE
JUDGMENTS OF Sept 19, 2007, Nunc Pro Tunc, and restore appellant
and the Cheyovich's sorely as the only rightful owners of the
Peacock 40 Acres Parcel,

waxes and wanes, more than arbitrarily,

void, and patently corrupt decisions by Judge Simpson,
in proceeding with absolute lack of and/or want of jurisdiction to destroy appellant's and the Cheyovich's ownership, economic and buiness pursuits of their sole ownership
of the P~~qrn~~ 40 acre parcel.
To more succintly cover respondents utter failures
to file a· vatid, properly noticedmnd legallysufficient
motionfor summary judgment, per I.R.CP. Rules

rs:i 16(a)

this argument appeal portions, addresses the utter ~.44\,IR! of

(c) (d) sard:1(e),
subject

matter jurisdiction and the utter failure of &§'p0ndentsto state any
viable causes of action for :(1) quiet title, 2). declaratory relief, 3)
preliminary

inj~unction

2.

o& permanent injunctions.

COMPLAINT'S FAILURE TO STATE ANY CAUSE OF ACTION.

An express grant of an easement as claimed by the
respondents,

cannot be created by "Parol"

School District No 131

Abbott v. Nam:R9l:cl

119 Idaho 544, 808 P.2d 1289

Abbott, etc. v. Nampa ,etc, 199 Idaho.,holclsclearly and
contnolling: "An easement can be created only by a person
who has title to or an estate in the servient tEnement.
An easement may not create a right the the gra·.:...wr did
not possess. The fact that a person attempt~ng to impose
an easement intends to acquire the title subsequently
and lim fact does not do so makes no difference.
"
Most

signi:l!ic®t~Y:'

controlling and applicable is the

Rule "An easement is a right in the land of another; one cannot
have an easement in

his~awn

lando"

92 Idaho 767, 452 Po2d 901.

Gardner v. Fliegal (1969)

(see axso Sinnett v. Werelus, 88

Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952, cited and followed 1n Abbot Vo Namva
Sch. Dist. No 131, 119 Idaho 544 , 808 P.2d 1289
26

The Abbott v. Nampa School case, supra, applied
the Doctrine of Merger, citing not·:,\ only Sinnett Vo Werelus,

-:;

supra, but a Nevada casej Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp
109 Nev 842, 858 P.2d 1258 --"Where

party acquired tit::.o

n;,

both servient and dominant tenements, the easement merges into
the fee of the servient tenemento"
The Doctrine of Merger of both the servient and dominant
temements occurred on

June 9, 1994 when appellant along with

his original joint venturers were granted by Teton West Corporation's Warranty Deed to the Peacock 40 acres Parcel.
ever

a~gument

What-

made by respondents to the contrary is utterly

false, deceptive and in violations of

I.R.C~P.

ll(a) (1).

On said same date, not only did appellant and his cojoint venturens
2knoiWof respondents' existence nor of their purchase over

tw~

]))

.sixs Cfrldmoths:1:.::Ira t~:r ga:ant.£)fre sponden ts' trustee grant deed, ;r::~s
filed on December 11, 1996.

Again on this latter date, there

was no granted, reserved, nor implied easement as respondents

36 contrivedly and deceptively fabricated.
own
of

dee~filed/recorded

_MergerK~Q:£

Moreover, respondents

December 11, 1996 also by the Docttine

not deeds or instruments which created any ease-

ment over appellant's Peacock Parcel, nor even any part of their
own 39 acres to the North of appellant.

(See Page P

0

2., supra).

Both the the Peacock Parcel and the respondents have no
easement or right of way of 60 foot width or any width whatsoever
within the western boundary of their respective

parcels.

For respondents attorneys not to have known such legal
merger doctrine and legal effect and undisputable fact more
than boggles the mind; it is an admission of actual traud and
27

proyes all the

element~and

factors fnat establish a prima

facie ca1;1se/co1;mt for intentional ,misrepresentation.
cannot be further ayoided, Utat respondents

1

(It

summary judgment

motion did not give:, the required notice, specific,ity. for
the court to

~yen

consider let

a~ong

embibe itself of

whetner respondents: t summary judgment mot ion . included that
of appellant"s affirmative answers and counterclaims.
didn 1 t

~

~:E~

C3ee supra, pages 16, par. 4 through Page 18, para.,-

graph 14}
But there are two (2) ,more additional factors of decep.,-.
tion and deceit by respondents1

~~e:,

[lJ- The warranty deed
.
~

issued to appellant and his joint venturers was vague and
~mbiguous

on its face and in its application.

No parol evide

ence was pleaded nor presented in the complainttto avoid the
abe61ute applications of the Statute of

Fita~ds,

I.C.

9~508;

subii'l·

paragraph 4, which reads:
"4. An agreement for the leasing,
for a longer period than on (1) year, or for the sale, of
real property of an interest therein, and such agreement
made by an agent of the sought to be charged, is invalid,
unless the authority of the agent be in writing, subscribed
by the party to be charged."
statut~of

The object of the

frauds is to prevent

paten~

tial fraud by forbidding disputed assertions of enumerated kinds
Frantz V. Parke, 111 Idaho

of contract without any wirtten bais

1005, 729 P. 2d 1068 (Ct.App. 1986). ·. The failure to comply with
... ~.....

the Statute of Frauds renders an oral agreement, ifthere was
one, unenforceable, both in

a~~~tJion

at law for damages and

In a suit in equity for specific perhnrmance. Hoffnia:ri v. SV Co.
1 o2 Idaho 1 8 7 , 6 2 8 P . 2 d 218
"

'

Cl 9 81 ) .
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··

The second factor,

(2), the Illegality of any contract or

even a warranty or grant deed can be and musttbe raised at
any stage of the litigation; the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
district court judge has the duty to

rais~~i11eg~ltryof

Ulrich's

two deeds to create a nonexpressly granted easement that is
barred by the Statute of Frauds.
Inc.,

v.

Pines Grazing Association,

Fyling Joseph Ranch LLC 265 P3d 1136,

1139~1142.

Thusly, a jurisdictional question is so fundamental, that the
appellate and district court, must
tion if no party has raised it.

a~dress

the issue of jurisdic-

State v. Johnso

. (1ov 2011)

266 P.3 1146
Appellant will not tell nor state for respondents' benefit ;
and use, what

l~gal

remedies or even equitable remedies might

be available, becuase a-ppellant believes on the status of the record
3dil.@;:ta':ttempted · wrongful offers for summary judgment; there aran·:t
any at law or equity.
of

~imitation

If even there

we~

theapplicable statutes

Of five years and three years are long ago expired

and preclude any attempt to

amended the complaint against

appellant, either at law or in equity.

Such pleading attempt

,Would be further misrepreentat.i0n and other claims being viola ted
of appellant's ownership in the Peacock 40 Acre Parcel.
R,l::t;spondents ;fgiled to plead any, yiable claim or cause o£ action for
quiet

title~

declaratory relief and injunctive relief.

The failure to

plead or prove a cause of action can be raised at any time IRBPr
Rule 12 (g) C4l.

But respondents did not go and prevail at

trial; theirs was a wholly unsupported summary judgment motion
per tRcr, Rule 56 Cal, CclC:dl and Ce).

Even

be£~~e

Simpson's Memor

respondents summary judgment motion, Judge
~Hecision

liminary Injunctinn, etc.,

Re; Plaintiffs' Motion for Pre(R: 47-99) which included as Exhibits

A and B, Judge Simpson's ORDER GRANTING BB.NANTING WEYNR BJlWSON
MOTION
and

FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

In

Tetonc CV 2001-265 (R: 74-93)

SECOND AMENBED JUDGMENT, in that same CV 2001-260,

was completely in error in all regards,

(R 96-991,

How could Judge Simpson

have failed to see that the doctrine of merger v1a the Abbott
case, supr

and the Idaho Statute of Limitations, I.C. 9-505(4)

did not create an utter lack of jurisdiction and a complete
failure to have plea and even via any trial on the complaint's
averments be aliliowed to go to the trial.?
The

MEMORANDUM DECISION

was not just in error but

wrong as to the fact there was a lack pf personal jurisdiction
and subjecat matter jurisdiction, in that:
1.

He in error concluded the Court had personal jurisdiction
over Appellat, but he never rules or acknowledged that
Appellant was in a fiduciary joint venture association
with the Cheyovich trustees of their FAmily Trust. Neither
appellant nor the Cheyuuich had been named and served nor
the Joint Venture associat~on of Peacock Parcel owneEs.
(See errors at R: 59)

2.

He found that the complaint was properly verified when
Thoms Uliich stated solely on information and belief
the truth of his averments.
But the truth was that
there was no easement at all granted to respondents because
the Abbott , case doctrine of merger had more than precluded
extinquished and void any such claim or evidence. (See
error 59-60) At no point of respodents' complaint did
Thomas Ulrich state under oath, notaF±zed that he personally
knew of the facts of his own personal knowledge.
The
verification by him was specious, hearsay and without
proper under oath statements per Rule 56(c)(d) (e).

3.

The warranty deeds, Ulrich 1-A and 1-B, were evn acknowledge by Judge Simpson as having been executed and then
purpoerted record a year and over four months after a-pellant and his cojoint,, venturers record their~s on June 9, 1994.
CSee errors R 60-64+ ,Jludge Stmpson even gets the wrong
aates of Appellant· s de~d from Teton West Corporation.)
"7"

30

,.

4.

Judge S:iJw£on does acknowledge that appellant cited and

reilie& upon the Iron Eagle Deve. LLC case, 138 Idaho 487,
but without any citation of authority rules "Bach does not define(d)
'adequate legal remedy' in this cae . . 11 :-';. and rules that appellant must "assert what other legl

remd~

is avaiiable which would

requries that this Cart disregard the injunctive relief the
Ulrib.h's seek."

(R: 64-65 (At this particular point Judge Simpson

had become an attorny and advocate and is recusal should have been
sua sponte.

He was more than an unbaised judge--he was without

knowledge of case law and the application of the Idaho Suatute of
Frauds, I.C.9-505(4).}
5.

J6dge Simspon refuses to hear appellants motions

ept 30, 2010, to which no opposition nor
made or raised by respondents.
motions were filed,

had been·

Thus 15 dasy after appellant's

they bee noticed although there were for

October 15, 2010 and he

(R: 65866) Judge

ob~ections

wh~che~e

directs they be refiled separately.

Simpsnn:~cilciidn~t

want to hear from appellant

and his timely served and notice motions.
6.

Via his Ex A and B, attached from the Teton CV 01-265

case he

does acts and relies on a nonfinal, but still appela

able case, and through his judicial suggestions and ruimngs
which he can't reverse, he seeks to enforce and implement
said EXIBITS A

~

I into respondents pleading, which the resondents

never do and avoid completely, being protected and given legal
umbre1la coverage by Judge Simspon igranting said Memorandum
Dec is ion ,

(Err o r , R : 5 5 - 5 6 )

When the times comes
mo~ions,

to hear respondents summary judgment

the foregoing biased, prejudiced and overlly premindset
31

rulin~s

and order ts granted by Judge Simpson, in his ORDER

GRATING J?LAI'NTI'F;F 1·S'MOTIGNFOR SUMMARY JUDMENT, filed June 6+,
2011.

CR:

(R;

197~226)

227~230)

The initill judgment was filed June 6, 2011

However an ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT JOHN BACH's

RULE 59 adn 60 'M,OTION AND GRATNI'NG IN PART PLAINTFF'SREQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, was filed Sept 13, 2011

(R;254~273)

Without notice or any hearing set, heard or ruled upon, a FIRST
AMENDED JUDGMENT, filed Octber 21, 2011 was filed.
ALL OF THE

'F1DR1EGOING~·o~,D~S

(R:

278-

AND ORIGINAL .JUDGMENT AND FIRST

AMENDED JUDGMENT ARE APPEALLED HEREIN AND TO BE OVERTURNED,
VACATING THE ORDER GRANTI'NG SUMMARY JUDGMEN'E FOR PLAINTIFFS

AND T.HE FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT, WHTCH INCLUDES GRANTING RESPONIJENTS
OVER $26,366.72; and retruning to the district court the pleaded
affirmative defenses and counterlcaims, which respondent's summary
judgment motions did not mention, address nor submit any affidvits,
admissible, rlevant and applicable to eliminate the genuine elements of material facts raised by said appellants' pleadings.
Verbillis v.· Dependable

Appliance Co.

(Ct.App 1984 107 Idaho 335,

689 P2d 227.
Under Rule 56(c) , appellant was not required to even file
any counter affidavits, but he did both in his verification ANSWER
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES & COUNTERLCAIMS (R:lOS.,-.115) arld his AFFIDAVIT
with Exhibits filed '.March 25, 2011, (R: 168-189)

Thusly, appellant

more than disputed and put into issue the overwhelming existence
of genuine issues of material fact and the lack of subrnect matter
<

and even lack of personal urisdicion issues.
The ORDERS GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ALONG WITH THE original
JUDGMENT And FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT must be refferse, vacate with
32

instruction to the district court to dismiss with prejudice' . .c

5-~,::,

respodents' entire four (4) counts and revers=ethe monetary
judgment granted responaents of $26,366.72.
The remaining ISSUES Number 3 and
withdrawn nor

l~(lj::N:red

~'

supra, are not

or aba'illdoned, as both the health of

appellant and his physicall proclivities have precluded
him, from

compet~~g

his arguemtsnand analysis of citations,

cases and statutes, etc.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

July 30, 201Z

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY OVERNIGHT AND
I the undersigned, hereby declare that on this date,
July 30, 2012, Iddid mail overnight via delivery the next
day in Boise, Idaho, P.0.83720-101,
and Original and six (6) copies and one (1) unbound copy,
to Clerk, Idaho Supreme Court, P.Oo Box 83720, Boise,
I~ahn9 83720-010: and
Two coprees to Charles A. Homer, Esq.
P.O. Box 50130, Idaho Falls, ID srro~
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